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Abstract
The emerging markets for credit derivatives have improved the liquidity of bank
assets by providing banks with various new possibilities for selling and hedging their
risks. This paper examines the consequences for banking stability.
In a simple model where liquidation of bank assets is costly, we show that increased
asset liquidity bene…ts stability by encouraging a representative bank to reduce the
risks on its balance sheet. Stability is further enhanced because the bank can now
liquidate assets in a crisis more easily. However, we …nd that these stability e¤ects
are counteracted by increased risk-taking by the bank. Overall, stability actually
falls because the improved possibilities for liquidating assets in a crisis make a crisis
less costly for the bank. The bank therefore takes on an amount of risk that more
than o¤sets the initial positive impact on stability.
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1 Introduction
Bank loans have always been considered as illiquid. This is usually explained by the private
information banks have about the quality of their loans: because this information is not
easily veri…able, potential buyers are reluctant to take on risk from such assets. There were
a few possibilities for banks to sell loans, such as through mortgage securitization or loan
sales, but this was mainly restricted to assets with low informational problems.
The recent advent of credit derivatives, however, has provided banks with a whole range
of instruments for selling loans and transferring loan risk (for an overview of these instru-
ments, see Standard & Poors, 2003). For example, pure credit derivatives, such as Credit
Default Swaps (CDS) or total return swaps (TRS), allow banks to buy protection on a
single exposure or on a basket of exposures. Hybrid products, such as Credit-Linked Notes
(CLN), embed credit protection into other securities. Perhaps as the greatest challenge to
the illiquidity of loans, portfolio products, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO),
enable banks to sell risks from their entire loan portfolio. A main advantage of these new
instruments over traditional forms of credit risk transfer is that their ‡exibility mitigates
informational problems1. Their introduction has also been facilitated by the growing avail-
ability of ratings and the build-up of credit analysis departments in non-bank institutions
(such as the insurance sector), which have helped to reduce the asymmetry of information
between the bank and the risk buyer. Growing regulatory pressure to manage credit risk
has been another driving factor behind the introduction of credit derivatives.
Since its inception in 1996, the credit derivatives market has been quickly expanding,
with annual growth rates of around 70¡100%. The outstanding value of credit derivatives is
1For example, the ‡exible maturity of credit derivatives can be used to address adverse selection prob-
lems (see for example, Du¢e and Zhou, 2001) and improve banks’ liquidation incentives (Arping, 2004).
Nicolo’ and Pelizzon (2004) show that credit derivatives can be desgined to lead to the reveleation of pri-
vate information. Portfolio products are typically structured such that banks retain a part of the risk, thus
helping to keep incentives aligned. Portfolio products obviously, also reduce adverse selection problems
compared to the sale of a single loan.
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currently estimated at around U$ 5; 000 bn and the market is expected to continue to grow
at a high pace (BBA 2004). Although the market for credit derivatives is still relatively
small if compared to other derivatives, its mere existence has undermined the traditional
inability of banks to manage their loan risk: “Derivatives and the more liquid markets
they encourage make possible a new discipline at commercial banks, that of active portfolio
management. ...unwanted credit risks can be divested in a variety of forms, through hedges
or purchases of insurance as well as outright sales in the secondary markets.” (Standard
& Poors, 2003).
The emergence of the credit derivative markets has naturally received widespread at-
tention among …nancial regulators. Although there are remaining concerns, regulators have
been largely welcoming their development on the grounds that the relative illiquidity of
loans has been a main source of banking fragility.2 The intuitive argument goes that an
improved ability to sell assets will make banks less vulnerable to liquidity shocks and is
further expected to reduce the overall level of risks on banks’ balance sheets by facilitating
diversi…cation and the transfer of risk out of the banking sector.
This is a static view. It ignores that banks may change their behavior as a result
of the increased liquidity of their assets. To start with, they may simply take on new
risks following a reduction in the risks on their balance sheet through credit risk transfer.
Consistent with this, Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) provide evidence that banks that
manage their risks in a loan sale market hold a larger share of their portfolio in risky assets
than banks inactive in loan sales. Furthermore, the fact that an increased liquidity of loans
helps banks to withstand a liquidity shock may encourage banks to engage even more in
risky activities. For example, despite the greater dependence of borrowers on banks in
the past, the portion of loans in banks’ portfolios has increased from 30% percent in the
mid-1930s to 60% in the mid-1980s. This has been attributed to a reduced sensitivity to
liquidity shocks following the introduction of the deposit insurance in the early 1930s (e.g.,
England, 1991).
2See FSA (2002), IMF (2002), OECD (2002), IAIS (2003), BIS (2004).
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The aim of this paper is to analyze whether such motives for increased risk taking may
lead to a reduction or even a reversal of the initial bene…cial impact of an increased liquidity
of banks assets. To address this issue, we consider a simple model of an unregulated
representative bank that has an incentive for taking on excessive risks because of limited
liability. Crises occur because a low return on loans can trigger bank runs. Bank loans are
partly illiquid in that they can only be sold at a discount to their economic value. This
creates a motive for the bank to limit the risks it retains on its balance sheet in order
to avoid a crisis in which it has to sell loans. In this framework, the bank’s optimization
amounts to choosing a probability of default that balances the bene…ts of higher riskiness of
the bank (i.e., a higher return if the bank survives) with its costs (an increased likelihood of
a crisis). Increased asset liquidity is modelled as an (exogenous) reduction in the discount
at which loans can be sold in normal times and in times of a crisis.3
We …nd that an increase in liquidity in normal times does not a¤ect stability. It
initially improves stability by facilitating the transfer of risk via a secondary market and
by increasing bank’s pro…ts. However, it does not a¤ect the bank’s optimal probability
of default. As a consequence, the bank increases risk taking in the primary market by
an amount that exactly o¤sets the initial impact on stability. These results are consistent
with the empirical work of Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004), who …nd that better access to
secondary markets increases banks’ pro…ts and lending, but does not necessarily reduce
banking risk.
By contrast, an increase in asset liquidity in times of crisis, paradoxically, reduces
stability. There is an initial positive impact on stability, this time because it makes the
bank less vulnerable to bank runs. This is counteracted by increased incentives for taking
on risks, …rst, because the likelihood of a bank run is reduced, and, second, because the
3In our analysis, there is in normal times no di¤erence between the impact of increased selling possi-
bilities and increased risk transfer possibilities. We therefore interpret asset liquidity in normal times as
also comprising risk transfer possibilities. By contrast, crisis liquidity is solely determined by the ability
to sell assets.
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costs of a bank run for the bank are reduced since the losses from selling loans in a crisis are
lowered. The latter leads to an increase in the bank’s optimal probability of default and
as a result the bank takes on an amount of risk that more than o¤sets the initial impact
on stability.4
Perhaps surprisingly, we therefore …nd that although the increased liquidity of the
bank’s assets removes a main cause of banking fragility, stability is not increased. The
reason for this is that any reduction in the bank’s stability reduces the bank’s costs from
retaining risk on its balance sheet and causes an o¤setting change in the bank’s behavior
in the primary market. Stability even falls if the losses from selling assets in a crisis are
reduced; the reason being that this undermines the bank’s incentives to limit its risk-taking,
while retaining its incentives for taking on excessive risks due to limited liability.
To be sure, the recent advent of credit derivatives and the increase in liquidity is has
brought about undoubtedly has bene…ts. It provides investors with a more e¢cient means
of investing in credit risk. As our analysis shows, it can also foster …rm …nancing by
reducing bank’s costs of bearing risk. However, the message of this paper is that these
bene…ts can come at the cost of reduced stability.
Financial regulators may want to address this stability problem and we study the
possibilities for doing this. To this end we extend our analysis to an environment in
which deposits are fully insured and regulators can impose Basel-style capital requirements.
We demonstrate that a negative stability impact arising from increased liquidity can be
counteracted by increasing capital requirements. However, we …nd that as asset liquidity
increases, capital requirements become a less e¤ective instrument for ensuring stability.
We show that a preferable means for undoing the impact of increased liquidity on stability
is to reduce the pay-o¤s for shareholders in a banking closure.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we relate the paper to the existing
literature. Section 3 describes the model of the unregulated economy and solves for the
4We also …nd that both types of liquidity increase the loss given default, and thus externalities associated
with the bank’s failure.
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equilibrium banking stability. Section 4 analyzes then the impact of increased liquidity.
Regulation is studied in Section 5 and the …nal section summarizes.
2 Related Literature
A large part of the academic literature on innovations in credit derivative markets has
concentrated on their impact on the borrower-lender relationship. Du¤ee and Zhou (2001)
have argued that the ‡exibility of credit derivatives can be used to mitigate adverse selection
problems arising from the credit risk transfer. Morrison (2001) has shown that credit
derivative markets can reduce banks’ incentives to monitor, which can be detrimental to
welfare by eroding the certi…cation value of bank loans. While these papers take the stand
that bank’s incentives are potentially harmed through the transfer of credit risk, Arping
(2004) has shown that credit risk transfer can actually improve incentives by leading to
a more e¢cient liquidation of …rms. There is also a related, older, literature focusing
on bank’s motives for selling loans in the secondary market, which seems to contradict
banks’ comparative advantage in acquiring information about borrowers (e.g., Gorton and
Pennacchi, 1995 and Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995).
While in our framework …nancial innovation is treated as exogenous, there is a strand
of the literature that has analyzed ‘optimal …nancial innovations’. Most of this work takes
the view of innovations that complete markets and increase spanning (see the surveys in
Allen and Gale, 1994, and Du¢e and Rahi, 1995). One would therefore expect …nancial
innovations to be welfare enhancing. Indeed, Allen and Gale (2004) …nd that in a …nan-
cial crisis setting the market completion function of …nancial innovations can be welfare
enhancing by increasing risk sharing possibilities. By contrast, Elul (1995) shows that
the introduction of new securities can have an almost arbitrary e¤ect on welfare. Similar
results are also obtained in Allen and Gale (1994 ), where innovations in an environment
with short-selling constraints are considered.
Our paper is most closely related to the literature that explores the relation between
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…nancial innovations and bank’s risk taking. Santomero and Trester (1997) consider inno-
vations that reduce the cost of overcoming informational asymmetries when selling assets
in a crisis, which correspond to our notion of an increase in crisis liquidity. They …nd
that such innovations lead to increased risk taking by banks. However, the focus of their
analysis is only on banks’ risk taking; the net impact on banking stability is not considered.
Instefjord (2005) analyzes risk taking by a bank that has access to credit derivatives for
risk management purposes. He …nds that innovations in credit derivatives markets (which
correspond to an increase in liquidity in normal times in our paper) lead to increased risk
taking because of enhanced risk management opportunities. Again, the analysis focuses on
the impact on risk taking. In particular, since Instefjord considers a dynamic risk manage-
ment problem with in…nitesimal small shocks, there are no banking defaults in equilibrium
and hence the banking sector is perfectly stable.5
3 The Model
An economy has the following time structure. At t = 0 a representative bank decides on
how much to invest in a risky asset, which we interpret as extending loans. At t = 1, the
bank has the possibility to sell o¤ a fraction of the risky asset it has bought at a secondary
market (this can be seen more generally as a transfer of credit risk because in the model,
risk transfer and sales of the risky asset at t = 1 are equivalent). At t = 2, uncertainty
about the return on the risky asset is resolved and the bank’s depositors decide whether to
run on the bank or not. At t = 3 asset returns are realized and all parties are compensated.
The bank has an exogenously given capital structure, consisting of deposits D and
equity W (in Section 4.1 we discuss the bank’s choice of its capital structure). The return
5Although no explicit solution for the equilibrium risk exposure is obtained, the paper conjectures that
if the loan market is elastic, banks’ retained risk can increase and that this may reduce banking stability.
Our analysis quali…es this conjecture by showing that the motivation for increasing retained risk is precisely
to o¤set an initial impact on stability. Thus, stability is not a¤ected by such type of innovations, even if
the loan market is perfectly elastic.
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required by depositors is 1 and the interest on deposits is i. We consider an unregulated
banking sector, in particular, deposit are not insured (in Section 5 we analyze deposit
insurance combined with capital requirements). Deposits are assumed to be made before
the bank decides about its risk taking. Hence, the interest rate i is independent of the
bank’s actual risk taking. Rather, the interest rate will re‡ect expected risk takin·g and
compensate depositors for their expected losses from default.
More speci…cally, the bank’s decision at t = 0 is how much of its capital to invest in the
risky asset and how much to hold in reserves. Denoting the amount invested in the risky
asset by X and the amount held in reserves by R we thus have
D +W = X +R (1)
Reserves are perfectly liquid and have a return of zero. The return on the risky asset
is r = ¹ + ", with ¹ ¸ 1. The asset shock " is uniformly distributed on [¡1; 1] with
probability density Á(") = 1=2. Hence E["] = 0 and the expected return is E[r] = ¹ ¸ 1.
As in Gennotte and Pyle (1991), the excess return on the risky asset is therefore not
restricted to be zero. We think of this as being the result of the bank’s superior ability to
screen and monitor local …rms, giving it a monopoly in the local loan market (Carlstrom
and Samolyk, 1995). The counterpart of this excess return, however, is that the risky asset
is partly illiquid, in a sense we specify below.
At t = 1, the bank sells o¤ the risky asset to investors. If the asset were fully liquid,
investors would be prepared to pay for an amount Y of the risky asset
pY = (¹¡ ®(Y ))Y
where p is the expected value of the asset net of a possible risk premium ®(Y ), with
®(Y ) ¸ 0 and ®0(Y ) ¸ 0 (non-decreasing absolute risk aversion).
However, even though the bank is assumed to be a monopolist in the secondary market,
it cannot extract fully the price p because of asset illiquidity. This is interpreted as being
the result of the bank’s private information about its loans, which gives rise to a lemon
problem (as in Du¢e and Zhou, 2001), or of reduced bank’s incentives to monitor and
8
evaluate the borrower following the sale of the asset (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995). An
alternative interpretation, and one that is potentially unrelated to informational problems,
is that there are simply imperfections on the buyer’s side, leading to market illiquidity.
Speci…cally, as in Rochet (2004), we assume the bank can only sell the asset at a
proportional discount ¯. Hence, denoting the amount of the risky asset sold by Y (Y · X),
the bank’s proceeds from the selling at the secondary market are
(1¡ ¯)pY
The extreme cases where the asset is completely illiquid and perfectly liquid can then be
represented by ¯ = 1 and ¯ = 0, respectively. We refer to ¯ in the following as risk transfer
costs; the reason being that the motivation for the bank to sell at the second market arises
from the asset’s riskiness (if the asset were not risky, the bank would prefer to retain it on
the balance sheet and recoup the full value at t = 2).
At t = 2, uncertainty regarding the asset shock " is resolved and r becomes known.
If, as a result, depositors decide to demand their deposits back and the bank’s liquidity is
not su¢cient to meet depositors’ demands, the bank has to liquidate the risky asset. We
assume that there are again proportional costs ° of selling the asset, for similar reasons as
for risk transfer costs. We term this costs liquidation costs and assume ° > ¯ because of
the higher urgency of asset sales in a bank run. Thus, if the bank sells an amount V of the
risky asset, it receives in return
(1¡ °)pV
where p = ¹+ " (there is no risk premium since uncertainty is resolved at t = 2).
The decision of depositors whether to run on the bank depends on their expectation
of the behavior of other depositors, giving rise to multiple equilibria and creating a need
for an equilibrium selection mechanism. We solve here for the risk dominant equilibrium
(Harsani and Selten, 1988). Applied to our context, this concept says that each depositor
believes that all other depositors (collectively) decide to run with probability 1=2 (‡at
beliefs) and simply plays its best response to this.
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Assume that the bank’s value is shared on a pro-rata basis in a run and that if the
expected pay-o¤ from running is identical to the one from not running, depositors do
not run. Assume, furthermore, that interest has already been incurred at t = 1. The
unique risk dominant equilibrium is then to run whenever the liquidation value of the
bank, denoted L, is lower than depositors’ claim to the bank, (1 + i)D; and not to run
otherwise. To see this, consider …rst L ¸ (1 + i)D. Then, even if all other depositors
decide to run on the bank, a depositor still receives the same amount as when he decides
not to run. Hence, he will not run. However, when L < (1 + i)D, a depositor’s expected
return from running is 1=2 ¢ L + 1=2 ¢ (1 + i)D, while his return from not running is
1=2 ¢ 0 + 1=2 ¢ (1 + i)D = 1=2 ¢ (1 + i)D and he therefore decides to run (in fact, any
positive probability attached to other depositors running on the bank yields the same
unique equilibrium).
The condition for no bank run taking place (L ¸ (1 + i)D) can hence be written as
(1¡ °)(¹+ ")(X ¡ Y ) + (1¡ ¯)pY +R ¸ (1 + i)D (2)
Using (1) and denoting with Z the amount of risk the bank has taken that is retained on
the balance sheet (Z = X ¡ Y ), (2) can be rearranged to
((1¡ °)(¹+ ")¡ 1)Z + ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y +W ¡ iD > 0 (3)
From (3), we de…ne the minimum asset shock b" that has to prevail in order for no bank
run occurring
b" = 1¡ [W + ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y ¡ iD] =Z
1¡ ° ¡ ¹ (4)
Because depositors run only when L < (1+ i)D, the bank has to fully liquidate its asset in
a run. Since this is not enough to fully meet depositors’ claims, a run always leads to the
default of the bank. If default occurs, the return on equity is zero due to limited liability
and the bank simply ceases to exist.
If the bank survives, the return on equity is the value of the bank’s portfolio net of
10
payments to depositors at t = 3
¼ = (¹+ ")Z + (1¡ ¯)pY +R¡ (1 + i)D
= (¹+ "¡ 1)Z + ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y +W ¡ iD (5)
The return on equity in case of survival consists thus of the excess return from loans that
are retained (¹+"¡1)Z, the excess return from loans that are sold in the secondary market
((1 ¡ ¯)p ¡ 1)Y , and bank’s equity at t = 0 minus interest payments W ¡ iD. Figure 1
depicts bank’s equity as a function of the asset return r (= ¹+ "), where br: = ¹+ b".
ð 
Z)ˆ( emg +
rrˆ
Figure 1: The Banks’s Pay-O¤ as a Function of the Return on the Risky Asset
The expected return on equity is then
E[¼] =
Z 1
b" [(¹+ "¡ 1)Z + ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y +W ¡ iD]Á(")d" (6)
Depositors return when the bank survives is (1 + i)D. When the bank defaults (" < b"),
they receive the liquidation value L. Using (1) and (4), L can be written as
L = (1 + i)D ¡ (b"¡ ")(1¡ °)Z
Since depositors require a return of 1, the equilibrium interest rate on deposits has to ful…ll
D =
Z b"
¡1
[(1 + i)D ¡ (b"¡ ")(1¡ °)Z]Á(")d"+ Z 1b" (1 + i)DÁ(")d"
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Rearranging for iD gives
iD =
Z b"
¡1
(b"¡ ")(1¡ °)ZÁ(")d" (7)
Since interest payments iD compensate depositors for their losses from default, the RHS of
(7) represents the expected loss from default for depositors. Note that (7) is an equilibrium
condition, i.e., Z and b" in (7) refer to depositors’ expectations about the bank’s choice of
these variables and not to the actual choices of Z and b". Depositors’ expectations, however,
may depend on ¯ and °. More formally, we can thus write i = i(¯; °) in (7).
3.1 Equilibrium Risk Taking and Banking Stability
We measure the stability of the representative bank by its probability of default, which is
given by
Pr(" < b") = Z b"
¡1
Á(")d" = (b"+ 1)=2 (8)
and determined by the minimum asset shock b". We also compute the expected loss given
default (LGD), which is a measure of externalities associated with banking failure. Re-
calling that the RHS of (7) gives the expected loss from default to depositors, the LGD is
given by
LGD =
R b"
¡1(b"¡ ")(1¡ °)ZÁ(")d"
Pr(" < b") =
R b"
¡1(b"¡ ")(1¡ °)Zd"b"+ 1 (9)
We assume that the bank’s managers maximize the wealth of shareholders, who are assumed
to be risk-neutral. Thus managers maximize E[¼] over Y and Z, taking as given D;W; ¹
and the interest rate i. Note that Y and Z are independent variables, i.e., an increase in
Z represents an increase in X for given Y . We focus in the following on parameter values
of the model for which interior solutions for Y and Z obtain.
We turn …rst to the optimal choice of Y . Denoting the excess return from secondary
market activity at t = 1 by A(Y ), with A(Y )
A(Y ) := ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y (10)
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we get the FOC for Y (from 6)
@E[¼]=@Y =
Z 1
b" A
0(Y )Á(")d"¡ ¼(b") @b"
@A
A0(Y )Á(") = 0 (11)
Using the de…nition of the minimum shock b" (equation 4) this can be simpli…ed to
A0(Y )Á(")
µZ 1
b" d"¡ °(¹+ b")Z @b"@A
¶
= 0
Since
R 1b" d" ¸ 0 and @b"=@A < 0 the expression in brackets is strictly positive, hence the
FOC implies that
A0(Y ) = 0 (12)
Note that because the optimal Y simply maximizes the excess revenue from secondary
market activity, it is independent of retained risk Z and the liquidation costs °.
We study next the choice of Z. From (6) we obtain the FOC
@E[¼]=@Z =
Z 1
b" (¹+ "¡ 1)Á(")d"¡ ((¹+ b"¡ 1)Z +A(Y ) +W ¡ iD)Á(")@b"=@Z
=
Z 1
b" (¹+ "¡ 1)d"¡ °(¹+ b")Z@b"=@Z = 0 (13)
The …rst term in (13) is the standard expression for the marginal bene…ts from retaining
more risk. Since ¹ ¸ 1, this expression is always positive. The second term in (13)
represents the marginal costs of retaining risk, which arise because more retained risk
increases the asset returns for which a bank run occurs (@b"=@Z > 0) and thus raises the
probability that the liquidation costs °(¹ + b")Z have to be incurred. An interior solution
for Z equates then the bene…ts from a higher return on equity if the bank survives with
higher expected costs due to liquidation. Proposition 1 identi…es the conditions under
which an interior solution exists.
Proposition 1 For ¹ < °=(1¡°), ° > 1=2 and W +A¡ iD > 0 there is a unique interior
solution Z¤ with Z¤ 2 (0;1).
Proof. See Appendix.
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The …rst condition, ¹ < °=(1 ¡ °), implies that for su¢ciently large Z the minimum
asset shock b" is 1 (i.e., the probability of survival is zero). This ensures that the marginal
bene…ts from retaining risk become eventually zero as the bank increases its retained risk
and thus allows for an interior solution. By contrast, if ¹ > °=(1¡°), one cas easily verify
from (4) that limZ¡>1b" < 1. The second condition, ° > 1=2, ensures the concavity of the
problem. For ° < 1=2, the problem becomes convex and only corner solutions exist. The
third condition, W +A¡ iD > 0, ensures that an increase in retained risk Z increases the
minimum asset shock (4). For W +A¡ iD < 0, the expected value of the bank at t = 0 is
negative for Z = 0 (from 6). An increase Z would then actually increase the bank’s chance
of survival because of ¹ ¸ 1 (“gambling for resurrection”).
For convenience we de…ne for the following analysis the marginal bene…ts MB and the
marginal costs MC from retaining risk
MB =
Z 1
b" (¹+ "¡ 1) d" (14)
MC = °(¹+ b")Z@b"=@Z (15)
and using the de…nition of A(Y ) we simplify the expression for the minimum asset shock
b" = 1¡ (W +A(Y )¡ iD)=Z
1¡ ° ¡ ¹ (16)
from which we can derive the sensitivity of b" with respect to retained risk (@b"=@Z)
@b"=@Z = W +A(Y )¡ iD
1¡ °
1
Z2
(17)
= (
1
1¡ ° ¡ ¹¡ b")=Z (18)
where we have made use of (16). Using (18) we can then simplify the expression for MC
(15) to yield
MC = °(¹+ b")( 1
1¡ ° ¡ ¹¡ b") (19)
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4 Asset Liquidity and Banking Stability
We start with the impact of a reduction in the liquidation costs °, i.e., an increase in
crisis liquidity. Note …rst that a change in crisis liquidity does not a¤ect secondary market
activity, i.e., dY=d° = 0. This can be seen from the de…nition of A(Y ) and the FOC for Y
(equations 10 and 12), showing that ° has no impact on the equilibrium choice of Y .
The direct impact of the reduction in ° on stability is positive. It raises the liquidation
value of the bank and thus lowers the minimum asset shock b" that ensures that depositors
do not run on the bank (equation 16). However, there is an o¤setting e¤ect because an
increased liquidation value means that a bank run is less costly for the bank (the MC
in 15 fall) and the bank therefore increases its retained risk Z. Proposition 2 shows that
Z is even increased by such an amount that the initial bene…cial impact on stability is
outweighed.
Proposition 2 An increase in crisis liquidity increases retained risk Z and reduces banking
stability.
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the intuition for this perhaps surprising result, consider a (hypotheti-
cal) increase in retained risk that exactly o¤sets the impact of the reduction in ° on the
minimum asset shock b". Denoting with Z1 the new level of retained risk and with b"0 the
equilibrium minimum asset shock before the reduction in °, the MB and MC would be
MB1 =
Z 1
b"0 (¹+ "¡ 1) d" (20)
MC1 = °1(¹+ b"0)Z1(@b"=@Z)1 (21)
From (20) we have then MB1 = MB0, i.e., the marginal bene…ts from retaining risk are
the same as before the change in °. From (21) we have that the reduction in ° reduces
the cost of liquidation for a given amount of assets that have to be liquidated and thus the
MC1 is lowered relative to MC0. There are additional e¤ects on the MC because changes
in Z; ° and i (remember that interest rates may change if depositors’ expectations about
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their expected losses change) a¤ect Z(@b"=@Z). However, from (18) it can be seen that the
overall impact of these latter e¤ects on the MC is negative. Hence we have MC1 < MC0.
Thus, if, following a reduction in °, the bank would increase its risk such that it reaches
the old b"0, the marginal bene…ts from retaining risk would still exceed the marginal costs.
The bank will therefore choose an amount of retained risk that exceeds Z1. Hence, the b"
in the new equilibrium is higher and the stability of the representative bank is reduced.
Proposition 3 shows next that the reduction in ° also leads to a higher LGD.
Proposition 3 An increase in crisis liquidity increases the LGD.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result can be easily understood by again considering an increase
in Z that o¤sets the initial impact of ° on b". We have then
LGD1 =
R b"0
¡1(b"0 ¡ ")(1¡ °1)Z1d"b"0 + 1 (22)
From (22) it can be seen that this increases the LGD because of the lower ° and the increase
in Z. The reason for this is that both the lower ° and the higher Z make the liquidation
value more sensitive to shocks, in the sense that a shock below the minimum shock b" (for
which there is no loss) leads now to higher losses for depositors. The equilibrium LGD
will be larger than LGD1 since the bank chooses an amount of retained risk that exceeds
the one that o¤sets the initial impact on stability (as Proposition 2 has shown).
We turn now to the analysis of increased liquidity in the secondary market, represented
through a reduction in the risk transfer costs ¯. A reduction in ¯ has a direct positive
impact on stability by increasing bank’s pro…ts from risk transfer (A(Y ) in 12), which
increases bank’s equity at t = 2 and thus reduces the minimum asset shock b". The lower
¯ also encourages risk transfer in the secondary market but this does not a¤ect stability
since Y only enters in the FOC for Z via A(Y ). Overall, stability does not change because
the bank o¤sets the impact of increased pro…ts on stability by increasing Z.
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Proposition 4 An increase in liquidity in normal times increases retained risk Z but does
not a¤ect banking stability.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result can be readily understood by noting that if the bank restores the old b" by
increasing retained risk, neither the marginal bene…ts MB (equation 14) nor the marginal
costs MC (equation 19) have been a¤ected by the reduction in ¯.
Proposition 4 modi…es previous results obtained by Instefjord (2004), who analyzes the
impact of a improved hedging e¤ectiveness through credit derivatives on bank’s riskiness.
An increase in the hedging e¤ectiveness in his paper is comparable to the reduction in ¯ in
the present paper. Although there is no explicit solution for the net e¤ect on retained risk
in Instefjord’s paper, it is conjectured that if the loan elasticity is su¢ciently large, the
e¤ect of additional risk taking could outweigh the reduction in risk through increased risk
transfer. Our analysis con…rms that retained risk increases for a high loan elasticity (which
is in fact in…nity in our model) but in deviation to Instefjord our results show that banking
stability is una¤ected. This is because the bank’s motive for increasing its retained risk is
precisely to o¤set the initial positive stability impact.
Proposition 5 shows next that although an increase in liquidity in normal times does
not a¤ect stability, it leads to a higher LGD. This is because the increased liquidity causes
the bank to retain more risk, asset shocks below the minimum asset shock b" lead to higher
losses for depositors (equation 9).
Proposition 5 An increase in liquidity in normal times increases the LGD.
Proof. Follows directly from (9) since we have from Proposition 4 that db"=d¯ = 0 and
dZ=d¯ < 0.
4.1 The In‡uence of the Capital Structure
Generally, improvements in asset liquidity may have an impact on the bank’s optimal
capital structure, which may modify our stability results. However, this is not the case in
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our model. This can be seen by noting that a change in D does neither a¤ect the MB nor
the MC for a given level of b" (from equations 14 and 19). Hence, any potential impact
arising from a changed capital structure on stability will be undone by the bank through
an adjustment of retained risk.6
5 Regulation
In this section we extend our analysis to an economy in which deposits are fully insured
by a (fairly priced) deposit insurance fund and where the regulator imposes Basel-style
minimum capital requirements. To this end we modify the setup as follows. Since iD
is equal to the expected losses to depositors from banking defaults (equation 7), we can
reinterpret iD as the payments of the bank to the deposit insurance fund, taking place at
t = 0. Capital requirements are introduced in a simple fashion by assuming that if the
equity of the bank at t = 2 falls short of a fraction k of its risky assets, the bank is shut
down. To keep the analysis comparable to the previous section, both equity and the risky
asset at thereby valued at their liquidation value. When the bank is shut down, its assets
are liquidated. Depositors are paid out …rst and any remaining value is distributed to the
shareholders of the bank. If the liquidation value of the bank is not su¢cient to cover
depositors’ claims, depositors will be compensated by the deposit insurance fund.
The condition for no banking closure is thus
((1¡ °)(¹+ ")¡ 1)Z +A(Y ) +W ¡ iD ¸ k(1¡ °)Z
i.e., the liquidation value of the bank net of depositors’ claims has to exceed k times the
liquidation value of the risky assets. Denoting with b"C the minimum asset shock that
6The optimal capital structure in our model is in fact indetermined: because iD can be substituted for
in the expression for E[¼] (equation 6, using equation 16 and 7), bank’s pro…ts are independent of iD. The
reason for this is that depositors are always fully compensated for any losses from default through higher
interest rates. It would be straightfoward to extend the model in order to obtain a unique optimal capital
structure, for example, by assuming increasing marginal costs of attracting local deposits.
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ensures that the bank is not closed we get
b"C = 1¡ (W +A¡ iD)=Z
1¡ ° ¡ ¹+ k (23)
The minimum asset shock b" that guarantees that the bank’s liquidation value is su¢cient
to pay out depositors is unchanged as in equation (16) and we thus have b"C = b"+ k.
The bank’s expected return consists now of the expected value of its portfolio net of
debt if the bank is not closed down (i.e., when " ¸ b"C) plus any remaining value that is
distributed to shareholders when the bank is closed down (this value is positive for " > b")
E[¼] =
Z 1
b"C [(¹+ "¡ 1)Z +A(Y ) +W ¡ iD]Á(")d"+Z b"C
b" [((1¡ °)(¹+ ")¡ 1)Z +A(Y ) +W ¡ iD]Á(")d" (24)
The expression for iD is unchanged (equation 7). Rearranging the FOC for Z (from 24)
and using b"C = b"+ k, we obtain the MB and MC
MB =
Z 1
b" (¹+ "¡ 1) d"¡
Z b"+k
b" °(¹+ ")d" (25)
MC = °(¹+ b"+ k)Z@b"C=@Z (26)
= °(¹+ b"+ k)( 1
1¡ ° ¡ ¹¡ b") (27)
From (25), (26) and (27) we can see that compared to the unregulated economy, both MB
and MC are changed because liquidation occurs already at b"C = b" + k rather than at b".
The marginal bene…ts are reduced because costly liquidation arises now also if b" · " < b"C.
The MC is increased because of the higher marginal liquidation shock b"C the value of the
assets that have to be liquidated is increased.
However, the proofs regarding the impact of asset liquidity on banking stability (stabil-
ity refers analogous to the previous sections to the probability that the bank’s debt exceeds
its liquidation value, i.e., " < b") and the LGD can still be readily applied.
Proposition 6 As in the unregulated economy, (i) an increase in crisis liquidity reduces
stability and increases the LGD, (ii) an increase in liquidity in normal times does not
a¤ect stability and increases the LGD.
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Proof. Analogous to Propositions 2 - 5, noting that @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b" is now @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b" =
¡(¹+ b"¡ 1)¡ °k ¡ °( 1
1¡° ¡ 2¹¡ 2b"¡ k) = ¡(2° ¡ 1)( 11¡° ¡ ¹¡ b").
Proposition 7 shows next that the impact of an increase in k on banking stability is
positive. Although there is no direct e¤ect of k on b", the increase in k reduces the MB
and increases the MC. Thus the bank reduces its retained risk and stability increases.
Proposition 7 An increase in capital requirements k reduces retained risk Z and increases
stability.
Proof. See Appendix.
Capital requirements can therefore be used to mitigate the impact of increased crisis
liquidity. However, they cannot be used to o¤set any negative stability impact. This is
because a banking closure is only an e¤ective threat for banks when it is costly. When
° is low the costs of banking closure are low and, consequently, capital requirements are
becoming ine¤ective.
Proposition 8 If the risky asset becomes perfectly liquid in times of crisis (° ¡! 0), bank
stability becomes minimal regardless the size of capital requirements k.
Proof. For ° ! 0 we have that MC ! 0 (from 27 and ¡1 · b" · 1). From MB !R 1b" (¹+ "¡ 1) d" > 0 for b" < 1 we have hence that dE[¼(Z)]=dZ > 0 for b" < 1. Thus
° ! 0 implies b" ! 1.
Suppose now that the regulator can change the cost of a banking closure to bank’s share-
holders. More speci…cally, assume that the regulator can impose a proportional penalty
± on the value of the bank’s risky assets when the bank is closed down. An example for
such proportional penalties (or subsidies if ± < 0) are tax deductions granted to …nancial
institutions that acquire assets of a bank that has been closed down by the regulator (as
has been common practice in the U.S.). Such tax deductions increase the price at which
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the …nancial institutions are prepared to acquire the bank’s assets and thus amount to a
reduction in ±.7
For given k, this penalty does neither a¤ect iD, b" nor b"C, therefore equations (7), (16)
and (23) still apply. The bank’s expected return is now
E[¼] =
Z 1
b"C [(¹+ "¡ 1)Z + ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y +W ¡ iD]Á(")d"+ (28)Z b"C
b" [(1¡ ° ¡ ±))(¹+ "¡ 1)Z + ((1¡ ¯)p¡ 1)Y +W ¡ iD]Á(") (29)
and the expressions for MB and MC become
MB =
Z 1
b" (¹+ "¡ 1) d"¡
Z b"+k
b" (° + ±)(¹+ ")d" (30)
MC = (° + ±)(¹+ b")Z@b"=@Z (31)
= (° + ±)(¹+ b"+ k)( 1
1¡ ° ¡ ¹¡b") (32)
Thus ± a¤ects the bank’s optimization problem by reducing the MB and by raising the
MC. As a consequence, an increase in ± leads to a reduction in the bank’s choice of retained
risk Z and thus b" falls.
Proposition 9 An increase in ± reduces retained risk Z and increases stability.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 10 shows next that penalties can be used to completely o¤set any impact of
a reduction in °. From (30) and (32), this is because they can directly eliminate the impact
of a change in the liquidation cost ° on the MB and the MC. Penalties are thus a more
e¤ective tool than capital requirements for counteracting the negative stability impact of
increased crisis liquidity.
Proposition 10 The stability impact of a change in the liquidation cost d° can be o¤set
by changing the penalty ± by d± = ¡d°.
Proof. Follows directly from (30) and (32) by noting that @MB=@° = @MB=@± and
@MC=@° = @MC=@±.
7Similarly, allowing the acquiring institution to use goodwill on its books can also be interpreted as a
reduction in ±.
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6 Summary
The various new credit derivative instruments have increased banks’ possibilities to manage
their loans, which have been traditionally considered as illiquid. What are the consequences
for the stability of the banking sector? This paper has shown that the bene…ts of increased
liquidity from facilitating risk transfer in normal times and from enhancing liquidation in a
crisis, are counteracted by corresponding increases in banks’ risk taking. Overall, stability
is reduced because the improved liquidation in a crisis reduce banks’ incentives to avoid a
crisis. Banks therefore take on an amount of new risk that leads to a higher probability of
default.
Regulators wishing to address this stability problem can do this by increasing capital
requirements. However, as asset liquidity increases, capital requirements become a less
e¤ective instrument for ensuring stability. A preferable means for undoing the impact of
increased liquidity on stability is to reduce the liquidation value of the bank.
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Proof of Proposition 1. Solving the integral in the expression for @E[¼]=@Z (from
13) gives
@E[¼]=@Z =
1
2
(1¡ b")(b"¡ 1 + 2¹)¡ °
(1¡ °)Z (¹+ b")(W +A¡ iD)
Substituting b" (using the de…nition of b" and A) yields
dE[¼(Z)]=dZ =
(2° ¡ 1)(W +A¡ iD)2 ¡ (°2 ¡ ¹2(1¡ °)2)Z2
2(1¡ °)2Z2 (33)
Setting to zero and solving for Z, noting that °2¡¹2(1¡°)2 > 0 because of ¹ < °=(1¡°),
gives
Z¤ = (W +A¡ iD)
s
2° ¡ 1
°2 ¡ ¹2(1¡ °)2
Since °2 ¡ ¹2(1 ¡ °)2 > 0, W + A ¡ iD > 0 and ° > 1=2 it follows that Z¤ 2 (0;1).
Di¤erentiating (33) wrt. Z gives
@E2[¼(Z)]=@2Z = ¡(W +A¡ iD)2 2° ¡ 1
(1¡ °)2Z3
hence, because of ° > 1=2, we have @E2[¼(Z)]=@2Z < 0 and therefore Z¤ is a maximum
and unique.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show …rst db"=d° < 0 and then dZ=d° < 0. db"=d° < 0:
From E[¼] =MB¡MC and using (14) and (19), the total di¤erential of dE[¼(Z)]=dZ = 0
wrt. ° is
ddE[¼]
dZ
d°
=
@ dE[¼]
dZ
@°
+
@ dE[¼]
dZ
@b" (db"=d°) = 0
From @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@° < 0 and @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b" = ¡(¹+b"¡ 1)¡ °( 1
1¡° ¡ 2¹¡ 2b") = ¡(2° ¡ 1)( 11¡° ¡
¹¡b") < 0 (because of the conditions for interior solutions ° > 1=2 and ¹ < °=(1¡ °) and
because of b" · 1) it follows that db"=d° < 0. dZ=d° < 0 : Using (7) to substitute iD in
(16) gives
b" = 1¡ (W +A)=Z
1¡ ° +
Z b"
¡1
(b"¡ ")Á(")d"¡ ¹
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Totally di¤erentiating wrt. ° gives
db"=d° = 1¡ (W +A)=Z
(1¡ °)2 +
(W +A)=Z2
1¡ ° dZ=d° +
Z b"
¡1
db"=d°Á(")d"
Solving the integral and rearranging gives
db"=d°(1¡ b"
2
) =
1¡ (W +A)=Z
(1¡ °)2 +
(W +A)=Z2
1¡ ° dZ=d°
Since db"=d° < 0 and 1 ¡ (W + A)=Z ¸ 0 (from 16 with ¹ + b" ¸ 0 and iD ¸ 0) it follows
that dZ=d° < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. From (9) we have that
dLGD=d° =
0B@ R b"¡1 [(1¡ °)Zdb"=d° + (b"¡ ")(¡Z + (1¡ °)dZ=d°]Á(")d"(b"+ 1)
¡ R b"¡1(b"¡ ")(1¡ °)ZÁ(")d"db"=d°
1CA
(b"+ 1)2
=
0B@ R b"¡1 [(b"¡ ")(¡Z + (1¡ °)dZ=d°]Á(")db"(b"+ 1)
+
R b"
¡1(1 + ")(1¡ °)ZÁ(")d"db"=d°
1CA
(b"+ 1)2 < 0
since dZ=d°; db"=d° < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The total di¤erential of dE[¼(Z)]=dZ = 0 wrt. ¯ is
ddE[¼]
dZ
d¯
=
@ dE[¼]
dZ
@b" (db"=d¯) = 0
hence db"=d¯ = 0 because of @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b" < 0 (which has already been shown in the Proof of
Proposition 2). dZ=d¯ < 0 : Using (7) to substitute iD in (16) gives
b" = 1¡ (W +A)=Z
1¡ ° +
Z b"
¡1
(b"¡ ")Á(")d"¡ ¹
Totally di¤erentiating wrt. ¯ gives
db"=d¯ = (W +A)=Z2
1¡ ° dZ=d¯ ¡
1=Z
1¡ °dA=d¯ +
Z b"
¡1
(db"=d¯)Á(")d"
Since db"=d¯ = 0 and dA=d¯ = @A=@¯ + (dA=dY )dY=d¯ = @A=@¯ < 0, it follows that
dZ=d¯ < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 7. From (25), (27) we have that
ddE[¼]
dZ
dk
=
@ dE[¼]
dZ
@k
+
@ dE[¼]
dZ
@b" db"=dk = 0
Since @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@k < 0 and @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b" < 0 (see Proposition 6) we have db"=dk < 0. From
db"=dk = (@b"=@Z)dZ=dk < 0 and @b"=@Z > 0 it follows then dZ=dk < 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. From (30),(32) we have that
ddE[¼(Z)]
dZ
d±
=
@ dE[¼(Z)]
dZ
@±
+
@ dE[¼(Z)]
dZ
@b" db"=d± = 0
Since @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@± < 0 we have (@ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b")db"=d± > 0. Since @ dE[¼]
dZ
=@b" = ¡(¹+b"¡ 1)¡ (° +
±)k ¡ (° + ±)( 1
1¡° ¡ 2¹ ¡ 2b" ¡ k) = ¡(2° + 2± ¡ 1)( 11¡° ¡ ¹ ¡ b") + ±1¡° < 0 (because of
the conditions for interior solutions ° > 1=2 and ¹ < °=(1¡ °)), it follows that db"=d± < 0.
From db"=d± = (@b"=@Z)dZ=d± < 0 and (@b"=@Z) > 0 (from 16) it follows then dZ=d± < 0.
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